by Mohammad Nasr Khater, Hamzeh Abu Issa, Majd Almanasra, Kamal Abdel Rahim Al Alaween, Hanan Hashim Ameer
Social Sciences & Humanities Open, Elsevier/Science Direct, Article 103994, Volume 14, December 2026
Abstract
This article offers a doctrinal and normative feminist comparison of consensual abortion regulation in Jordan and Tunisia. It asks three questions: how consensual abortion should be distinguished from non-consensual and medically indicated pregnancy termination; how fetal protection should be balanced against women’s dignity, health, equality, bodily integrity, and reproductive autonomy; and how the two legal models affect sexual-violence survivors, healthcare providers, and access to lawful care. Jordan adopts a predominantly restrictive criminal framework under Articles 321–325 of the Penal Code, while Article 12 of the Public Health Law No. 47 of 2008 creates a statutory exception where termination is necessary to protect the pregnant woman’s life or health.
Tunisia, by contrast, permits abortion during the first three months within a regulated medical setting and allows later termination on specified medical and fetal grounds under Article 214 of the Penal Code. Using a reproductive-justice framework informed by intersectional feminist scholarship, the article evaluates not only formal legality but also the distribution of risk, stigma, delay, and institutional power. It argues that sexual-violence pregnancy is a particularly revealing test of the proportionality of criminalisation, while provider regulation matters because it conditions whether formal legal entitlements can be realised safely. The article treats Tunisia as a functional comparator rather than a model for transplantation. It concludes that WHO’s contemporary decriminalisation and abortion-on-request recommendations provide the stronger normative benchmark, while Jordan-specific reforms may also proceed incrementally through repeal of honour-based mitigation, expansion of lawful access, revision of provider aggravation, and procedural safeguards that avoid making legal access illusory.
Introduction and analytical framework
Whether consensual abortion should be criminalised remains one of the most contested questions in criminal law, public health, family policy, feminist legal theory, and human-rights practice. The controversy is not exhausted by asking whether fetal life deserves legal protection. A women-centred analysis must also ask how criminal law governs pregnancy, sexuality, family honour, social stigma, poverty, medical access, and the unequal burdens imposed on women and girls when pregnancy is compelled by penal threat. This article therefore approaches abortion law as both criminal law and gendered social regulation…
The study addresses three interlinked questions. First, how should consensual abortion be defined and distinguished from non-consensual abortion, medically indicated pregnancy termination, and other obstetric or contraceptive interventions? Secondly, is consensual abortion best understood as an aspect of women’s reproductive autonomy, an offence directed primarily at fetal life, or a legal conflict among fetal protection and women’s dignity, health, equality, and bodily integrity? Thirdly, what do the Jordanian and Tunisian models imply for sexual-violence survivors, healthcare providers, women exposed to clandestine abortion, and women whose formal legal entitlements may be obstructed in practice?
This article is a long, detailed comparative analysis of abortion law in the two countries that deserves to be read in full. The above is only the beginning of a rich comparison.
SOURCE: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590291126015627?via%3DiHub