InterAmerican Court of Human Rights: Decisions and Judgments
Case of Beatriz et al. v. El Salvador.
Merits, Reparations and Costs.
Judgment of November 22, 2024. Series C No. 549.
(Only in Spanish)
https://www.corteidh.or.cr/casos_sentencias.cfm?lang=en
Beatriz was a young Salvadoran woman with a one-year-old child who experienced a pregnancy that gravely endangered her health. The fetus had anencephaly, which is incompatible with life. Against her explicit will, the Salvadoran authorities denied her timely access to terminate the pregnancy in 2013. She was later killed in a car accident. The demand for justice for Beatriz was led by the Agrupación Ciudadana por la Despenalización del Aborto and drew support from across the Latin American feminist movement and internationally. Her mother and family supported her throughout and were present at the ruling. The case was finally heard by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 2024. On 20 December 2024, the Court issued a ruling in the case Beatriz and Others v. El Salvador, holding the Salvadoran State accountable for violating Beatriz’s human rights.
One of the five judges who heard the case, Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto, wrote a “concurring and partially dissenting opinion” on the Court’s judgment. Excerpts from his opinion have been translated into English (unofficially) by Dana Repka, LL.M. Candidate & Fellow, International Reproductive and Sexual Health Law Program, University of Toronto, and are published below.
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Concurring and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto
Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto is a Judge of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights since 2013 and served as its President during the 2014-2015 biennium. Previously he had served as Judge (2004-2012), Associate Judge (2001) and Assistant Judge (1992) in the Colombian Constitutional Court. SOURCE: Institute for Integrated Transitions, 10 November 2021.
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Case of Beatriz et al. v. El Salvador
Judgment of November 22, 2024
(Merits, Reparations, and Costs)
(Only in Spanish)
[This translation into English is not official. The paragraphs below are excerpts from the full statement which, including references, is 33 pages.]
With the customary respect for the decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Court” or “the Tribunal”), this opinion seeks to express my disagreement with the reasoning used to establish the international responsibility of the State of El Salvador (hereinafter “the State” or “El Salvador”) for the violation of the rights to personal integrity, health, private life, judicial guarantees, and judicial protection to the detriment of Beatriz. It also addresses the scope of the guarantee of non-repetition involving the creation of medical care protocols. Specifically, I believe the Court failed to analyze the most significant human rights violations in the case and to order effective reparative measures to prevent their recurrence, thereby inadequately addressing the victim’s demand for justice.
The judgment focuses on three decisions by the Medical Committee of the National Maternity Hospital, which, according to the Tribunal, concluded that the termination of Beatriz’s pregnancy, given her medical condition and that of the fetus (non-viability of extra-uterine life), was necessary to avoid risks to her personal integrity. The judgment also mentions the decision of the Constitutional Chamber, which indicated that if the treatment was carried out, the medical practitioners would have to assume the legal consequences arising from the criminalization of abortion. Based on these facts, the Court concluded that El Salvador must establish protocols allowing medical professionals to proceed with appropriate treatment in high-risk pregnancy cases. In their absence, it found violations of the rights to health, personal integrity, private life, and the prohibition of violence against women.
As I will explain below, I believe the Court should have concluded that El Salvador was internationally responsible for violating the rights to personal integrity, liberty, private life, and equality and non-discrimination, in relation to the right to health and the obligation to eradicate violence against women under the Belém do Pará Convention. These violations were caused by the criminalization of abortion in cases of risk to the mother and non-viability of the fetus’s extrauterine life. Furthermore, the Court should have concluded that such prohibition and its consequences for medical care violated Beatriz’s right to life and reproductive autonomy. Consequently, it should have declared violations of Articles 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “the Convention” or “ACHR”) and Article 7(e) of the Belém do Pará Convention, due to the existence of provisions that prevent the exercise of sexual and reproductive rights, and ordered legislative measures to ensure that incidents like this case do not recur.
To support this position, this opinion is divided into two sections: (i) the Court’s jurisprudence on sexual and reproductive rights and its failure to apply this to the specific case, and (ii) the criminalization of voluntary termination of pregnancy in cases of risk to the mother and non-viability of the fetus’s extrauterine life and the use of medical protocols in El Salvador. Regarding my dissent from the arguments used to justify the justiciability of the right to health in this case, I find it unnecessary to reiterate the profound logical and legal inconsistencies of this jurisprudential position. For these purposes, I refer to my previous opinions on this matter.
The Lack of Analysis of Sexual and Reproductive Rights in Beatriz’s Case
22.The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on sexual and reproductive rights was openly ignored in this case, as the Court chose to analyze it exclusively from the perspective of the right to health. The judgment does not acknowledge or refer to Beatriz’s reproductive autonomy, nor does it mention the risks that the pregnancy posed to her life or the particular content of her rights as a young woman living in poverty. It also fails to analyze the obligation to eradicate stereotypes associated with motherhood and discriminatory practices regarding access to sexual and reproductive health in the context of the criminalization of voluntary termination of pregnancy. Furthermore, the concept of obstetric violence was incorrectly applied in the judgment, which further endangers women like Beatriz as well as the medical professionals treating them.
23.As I will explain in this section, the failure to apply precedents on sexual and reproductive rights is not merely a formal or symbolic deficiency; it had profound implications for the way the Court established international responsibility and the reparative measures ordered. Consequently, it affected the protection that the Court was obligated to provide to Beatriz, as well as to other women and girls in similar situations in El Salvador and other countries in the region, who will be impacted by this harmful precedent.
24.In the judgment, the Court noted that “[t]he medical circumstances of Beatriz imposed a special duty of protection in her favor, obliging the treating physicians to provide diligent and timely care, with special consideration for the fact that her health condition could worsen over time. However, the lack of legal certainty regarding the approach to Beatriz’s situation forced her case to be bureaucratized and judicialized, first through various requests to different state bodies that provided contradictory responses […] and later through a writ of amparo” (paragraph 138). Thus, in summarizing the legal issue of the case, the Tribunal ignored the fact that the diligent and timely treatment required in this case to protect Beatriz’s life and integrity was expressly requested by her. As a result, this lack of care violated, in addition to the rights declared as infringed, her rights to life, dignity, and personal autonomy.
25.Regarding the right to autonomy, particularly reproductive autonomy, which is notably absent from the judgment, it is important to highlight that since the Artavia Murillo and I.V. cases, the Court has recognized this right as a central component of the rights to personal integrity, liberty, and private life. Additionally, it indicated that the protection of this component under Articles 5, 7, and 11 of the ACHR is particularly relevant in the case of women due to their biological capacity for motherhood. Nevertheless, despite its close relevance to Beatriz’s case, these precedents were grossly omitted in the judgment, as the Court chose to address the matter as merely a question of medical negligence, prioritizing the scientific perspective over individual volition. In my view, and according to established precedent, the Tribunal should have concluded that the absolute criminalization of voluntary termination of pregnancy in this case allowed Beatriz to be instrumentalized and turned into a means to ends unrelated to her choices about her own life, body, and full personal development.³⁵ These choices were further supported by medical criteria indicating risks to her life and personal integrity if the treatment was not performed. Following the interpretation that prioritizes autonomy in making decisions about one’s own body, health, and reproduction, the main duty that the State failed to fulfill was to prevent Beatriz from exercising her right to make a decision about the fate of a pregnancy involving a fetus incompatible with extrauterine life, which posed risks to her life and her role as a mother to her one-year-old child.
26.In this regard, I must draw attention to the Court’s grave failure to consider Beatriz’s written statement presented to the Constitutional Chamber on May 7, 2013, in which she stated:
27.*”I have a high-risk pregnancy, and knowing that the baby will not live, I want to ask you to please help me terminate the pregnancy. Everyone knows that I have a one-year-old child, and I believe you wouldn’t want that child to be left without a mother. I want to live for him, to always be there for him and care for him. Right now, while I feel well, I want you to help me, not when I am much sicker.”
28.Moreover, the Tribunal overlooked a crucial analysis regarding the adequacy of the information and resources that would have enabled Beatriz to exercise her right to freely and responsibly decide the number of children she wanted to have and the spacing of their births, given her circumstances and those of the fetus. Specifically, it failed to analyze her statements recorded in the social worker’s report, conducted on behalf of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, which indicated that Beatriz was aware of her situation and, during the interview, expressed agreement with the medical recommendation to terminate her pregnancy.
29.In this context, it is unacceptable that the Tribunal only considered Beatriz’s will to terminate the pregnancy as expressed through the testimony of a doctor (paragraph 143). The Court should have considered that during the pregnancy, despite her desire to be a mother, and while less invasive methods for termination were still possible, she expressed to the Office of the Attorney General and the Constitutional Chamber her decision for an early termination of her pregnancy, as well as her fears, concerns for her life, and the protection she wanted to provide to her already-born child. These entities were the only ones, as reiterated by the doctors, that could authorize the treatment, as the healthcare professionals would not proceed knowing the legal risks they might face due to the absolute criminalization of abortion. Indeed, after the second Medical Committee meeting, they stated: “Despite the above and our agreement with proceeding based on medical knowledge, we are all subject to the country’s laws, and as professionals at the hospital, we cannot break the law” (paragraph 53)
30.In addition to the above, it is unacceptable that the judgment failed to conduct a gender-sensitive analysis. As a human rights tribunal that has recognized the discriminatory and violent practices affecting women and girls in the Americas, the Court should have reiterated its precedent established in the I.V. v. Bolivia case, which held that the scope of women’s sexual and reproductive rights differs from that of men and that these rights have historically been limited for women due to negative or harmful stereotypes. Similarly, the Court should have considered, as it did in the Manuela v. El Salvador case, that the lack of adequate medical care during pregnancy or childbirth in public hospitals and within the context of criminalization of abortion in that state constitutes an act of discrimination. However, contrary to the protective role it usually assumes in its contentious function, the Court ignored that, due to her condition as a mother of a 13-month-old child and as a pregnant woman, Beatriz faced multiple stereotypes and societal burdens that imposed on her the duty to prioritize these roles over her own life and integrity.
31.Furthermore, the Tribunal did not take into account that this inability to make decisions about her own body, particularly when it was necessary to protect her life and integrity and knowing the fetus’s inviability, is a burden not imposed on women who seek care at private hospitals in El Salvador. In this sense, the State’s arguments claiming that the fetus should have special protection because it was a disabled female child are unacceptable. While, under the gradual and incremental protection of the right to life, the fetus had some degree of protection, this is not comparable to that of a disabled female child, given the unquestionable incompatibility of the fetus with extrauterine life (paragraph 47).
32.Regarding obstetric violence, the Court was imprecise in applying its precedent established in the Brítez Arce case and reiterated in the María and Rodríguez Pacheco cases, thereby setting a harmful precedent for women and physicians in the region. In the judgment, the Court stated that “Beatriz was not adequately cared for to safeguard her health, considering her underlying illness, the risk factors she accumulated, and the inviability of extrauterine life of the fetus due to the diagnosis of anencephaly. These circumstances imposed a special duty of protection requiring the State to provide diligent and timely care. However, the context of legal uncertainty resulted in Beatriz being subjected to waiting periods to make decisions about her treatment, which were subordinated to obtaining administrative or judicial authorizations” (paragraph 149). Thus, while it is clear that Beatriz suffered dehumanizing, disrespectful, and negligent treatment during her pregnancy and was denied the treatment required to protect her life and integrity, the Court did not sufficiently explain the cause of such treatment.
33.Since the Brítez Arce case, the Court has stated that obstetric violence is a form of gender-based violence “exercised by healthcare providers on pregnant individuals during access to health services occurring during pregnancy, childbirth, and postpartum.” In the Beatriz case, the Tribunal reiterated this standard (paragraph 148), leading to the conclusion that the perpetrators of obstetric violence were her treating physicians. I believe this is a grave error, as the violence in this case stemmed from actions and omissions by other state agents. This is not merely a legal technicality without material relevance but could have profound negative effects on medical practice. In this case, the healthcare providers indicated on three occasions that, according to their scientific judgment, the appropriate treatment to protect Beatriz’s life and integrity was the termination of the pregnancy. Moreover, considering that abortion is criminalized in El Salvador, they turned to the relevant administrative and judicial bodies to request authorization for the treatment. Therefore, to suggest, as the judgment seems to imply, that healthcare professionals were negligent and provided dehumanizing treatment to Beatriz, is an unfounded accusation that could have a deterrent effect on medical professionals in future cases. In my view, the obstetric violence in this case was caused by the legislation and actions of the judiciary in El Salvador, which, by maintaining an absolute prohibition on voluntary termination of pregnancy and failing to conduct a conventionality review when deciding on the amparo action, prevented Beatriz from freely making decisions about her motherhood and prevented physicians from fulfilling their duty to protect their patient’s life and integrity.
34.Indeed, within the context of the criminalization of voluntary termination of pregnancy, which prevented medical personnel from performing the recommended treatment, on April 11, 2013, Beatriz’s legal representation filed an amparo action before the Constitutional Chamber requesting the State to “issue an immediate provision to the authorities of Hospital Dr. Raúl Arguello Escalón” to intervene immediately to save her life, which was in grave danger.” However, Beatriz did not receive a response that considered the need to protect her rights under the terms of the American Convention. Instead, the fetus’s life was prioritized, despite its inviability. In fact, the Constitutional Chamber held that “there is an absolute impediment to authorizing the practice of an abortion as it contravenes the constitutional protection granted to human beings ‘from the moment of conception,’ art. 1(2) Cn. Under such imperatives, the circumstances enabling medical intervention and the opportune time for it are strictly decisions for medical professionals, who, on the other hand, must assume the risks involved in exercising their profession.”⁴¹ Thus, to declare the occurrence of obstetric violence in this case, the Court should have evaluated the actions of the Constitutional Chamber, which in this case caused the dehumanizing, disrespectful, and negligent treatment Beatriz experienced during her pregnancy and denied her the treatment required to protect her life and integrity.
35.Furthermore, I must point out that, although it was not recognized by the Court, the State also violated Beatriz’s right to life. On the one hand, it was sufficiently demonstrated that Beatriz’s life was at risk due to the pregnancy, and consequently, the lack of medical attention constituted a danger to her life attributable to the State. Indeed, as indicated in the judgment, the medical report of March 22, 2013, stated that “[i]n view of the severe maternal illness with a high probability of maternal death […] the perinatology department, through its head, requests the opinion of the legal medical committee of this hospital to address the legal medical problem of the case and seek a resolutive measure to safeguard the mother’s life” (paragraph 48). Moreover, the State itself, in the proceedings before the Commission, acknowledged that the Hospital’s Medical Committee recognized the risk to her life, specifically stating that “[…] the termination of the pregnancy, even at the time when the Committee was conducting its evaluation – 13 weeks – implied a risk, albeit lower, of medical and surgical complications that could lead to death due to the progression of the disease she suffers from.”
36.While in the context of the amparo process, the Institute of Legal Medicine held a different opinion, specifically that “there is no clinical or laboratory evidence of any imminent, real, or current circumstance that places [Beatriz’s] life at risk” (paragraph 139), this should have been analyzed alongside the opinions of the treating physicians. In particular, the Court should have considered that, in his statement during the public hearing, Dr. Ortiz indicated that after undergoing the physiological changes of pregnancy, it was necessary to perform a biopsy and other tests to assess the impact on Beatriz’s integrity and the risk to her life. However, these tests were not conducted.⁴³ Therefore, it was not possible to give precedence to the opinion of the Institute of Legal Medicine, especially when the necessary medical analyses were not performed and there were allegations of due process violations in the context of that expert opinion.
37.On the other hand, the judgment ignores the precedent according to which, when the “State does not take appropriate measures to prevent the risks of maternal mortality, it clearly impacts the right to life of pregnant and postpartum women.” It was absolutely clear that the State violated the right to life in this case because, in addition to Beatriz’s life being at risk, it failed to implement measures to ensure that the criminalization of voluntary termination of pregnancy did not prevent the medical treatment required to avert her potential death. This omission by the Court is unacceptable, as it appears to suggest that violations of the right to life only occur when the victim has died, and not when there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the State failed to implement measures to prevent a clear risk to this right. I find this approach highly objectionable, not only because the obligation to guarantee the right to life includes the duty to implement preventive measures, particularly in the face of maternal mortality risks, but also because it is contradictory to other cases. Indeed, I find it inconsistent for the Court to declare a violation of the right to life solely for the lack of investigation into homicide cases not attributable to the State⁴⁶ but in cases like Beatriz’s, involving proven life risks and a lack of prevention attributable to the State, to reduce the scope of protection of that right.
38.In conclusion, the lack of analysis of the standards on sexual and reproductive rights in this case is inadmissible, as there are no arguments to justify the marginal treatment the Court gave to women’s rights in this case. Contrary to what was done in the judgment, I believe the case should have declared the international responsibility of El Salvador for the violation of the rights to life, personal integrity, liberty, private life, and equality and non-discrimination, because the absolute prohibition of voluntary termination of pregnancy, ratified by the Constitutional Chamber, prevented Beatriz from exercising her reproductive autonomy, put her life at risk, caused profound harm to her physical and mental integrity, and constituted an act of discrimination and obstetric violence. By failing to do so, the Court abandoned its jurisprudence on sexual and reproductive rights and omitted to apply a gender perspective. In doing so, the Tribunal disregarded Beatriz’s rights and set a harmful precedent by diluting the special protection that the Tribunal has granted to women. This decision contrasts with its expansive logic of extending competence both temporally and substantively.
The Criminalization of Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy in Cases of Risk to the Mother and the Use of Medical Protocols in El Salvador
39.Since the Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica case, the Court has maintained that, within the framework of the American Convention, the protection of life from conception cannot be absolute; it allows for exceptions and, in any case, must be gradual and incremental. Specifically, the Tribunal has indicated that “[t]he Court has employed various methods of interpretation, which have led to consistent results in the sense that the embryo cannot be understood as a person for the purposes of Article 4.1 of the American Convention. Likewise, after analyzing the available scientific bases, the Court concluded that ‘conception,’ in the sense of Article 4.1, occurs from the moment the embryo is implanted in the uterus, and thus, before this event, Article 4 of the Convention would not apply. Additionally, it can be concluded from the words ‘in general’ that the protection of the right to life under this provision is not absolute, but gradual and incremental depending on its development, as it does not constitute an absolute and unconditional duty but implies recognizing the admissibility of exceptions to the general rule.” I believe that, from this interpretation of the right to life, along with the rights to personal integrity, liberty, private life, and ultimately as a principle of protecting human dignity, it follows that no one can be forced to prioritize the life of another over their own. This includes pregnant women whose lives are at risk due to pregnancy.
40.In the judgment, the Court stated that “[l]egal uncertainty inhibited the actions of health personnel, as they were afraid of incurring criminal liability, leading them to seek authorization from different entities. For their part, Beatriz’s representatives had to file an amparo action for the same purpose. However, this fruitless bureaucratization and judicialization of the medical treatment to be provided […] far from being effective, hindered the proper and timely protection of Beatriz’s rights to integrity and health, which constituted a violation of Article 2 of the Convention” (paragraph 154). Ultimately, the Court concluded that the lack of clear action protocols for a case like Beatriz’s was the cause of the violation of her rights to health and integrity (paragraph 155). I believe this analysis overlooked that the cause of the violation of Beatriz’s rights was the absolute criminalization of abortion in El Salvador, ratified by the Constitutional Chamber, which prevented measures from being taken to protect her autonomy, life, and personal integrity.
41.Abortion is punishable in El Salvador without exception. Article 133 of the Penal Code states: “[a]nyone who induces an abortion with the woman’s consent, or any woman who induces her own abortion or consents to another person performing it, shall be punished with imprisonment of two to eight years.” Furthermore, Article 135 imposes a harsher penalty for medical professionals engaging in this conduct: “[i]f the abortion is performed by a doctor, pharmacist, or persons carrying out auxiliary activities in these professions, when they engage in such practice, they shall be punished with imprisonment of six to twelve years. They shall also be disqualified from practicing their profession or activity for the same period.” While general grounds for excluding liability exist (Article 27 of the Penal Code), these do not negate the criminal nature of the actions and therefore do not eliminate the intimidating effect of criminal law.
44.In light of the obligations contained in the American Convention, it is erroneous to consider that the conduct (abortion in cases of risk to the mother’s life or the fetus’s inviability) can be typical. There are no elements justifying the State’s reproach of conduct that constitutes necessary medical treatment to safeguard the life or personal integrity of women. On the contrary, it is a necessary means for the exercise and protection of multiple rights protected by the American Convention, supported by strict medical-scientific criteria. It is also invalid to ignore the intimidating effect of criminalization on the argument that an exclusionary cause of liability can be demonstrated. As the Court held in its most recent case, *Capriles v. Venezuela,* the mere existence of the criminal provision has an inhibitory effect on the exercise of rights. This effect was evident in this case, as doctors refrained from performing the treatment for fear of prosecution, affecting Beatriz’s rights to life and integrity. I consider this disparate treatment between freedom of expression and the rights to life and integrity to be unjustified, especially as it results in significant under-protection of women’s rights.
46.Precisely to avoid the described circumstances, it is contrary to the American Convention to criminalize abortion in cases of risk to the mother or inviability of the fetus’s extrauterine life. An analysis that considered these elements was grossly omitted by the Court. The decision of a woman to terminate a pregnancy when her life or integrity is endangered by continuing it or when the fetus’s extrauterine life is unviable is legitimate, and it is unreasonable to initiate criminal proceedings with the threat of penal sanctions. The contrary stance, adopted by the Tribunal in this case, disregards women’s rights to life, integrity, liberty, private life, and, ultimately, the protection of their dignity and their right to live free from violence and discrimination.
47.Firstly, the notion of gradual and incremental protection of life under the American Convention demands prioritizing the mother’s rights when her life or personal integrity is at risk due to the pregnancy, or when the fetus’s extrauterine life is unviable, without fear that she may be penalized for protecting her life and integrity and exercising her autonomy. Requiring women to prioritize the fetus’s life over their own or to carry a pregnancy to term for a fetus whose life is unviable imposes excessive suffering and anguish—which can amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment—, is disproportionate, and constitutes an arbitrary interference in private life when the mother’s will to terminate the pregnancy has been expressed.
48.On this matter, the Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, stated that “[a]lthough States Parties may adopt measures to regulate the voluntary termination of pregnancy, such measures must not violate the right to life of the pregnant woman or girl or the other rights recognized in the Covenant. Restrictions on women’s or girls’ ability to access abortion must not, among other things, jeopardize their lives, subject them to physical or mental pain or suffering that violates Article 7 of the Covenant, or result in discrimination against them or arbitrary interference with their privacy. States Parties must provide safe, legal, and effective access to abortion where the life or health of the pregnant woman or girl is at risk, or where carrying the pregnancy to term would cause substantial pain or suffering to the pregnant woman or girl, especially when the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest, or when it is not viable.”
49.Similarly, the Committee of Experts of MESECVI, the Follow-Up Mechanism to the Belém do Pará Convention, has stated that “forcing a woman to continue with her pregnancy, especially when it is the result of rape, or when the life or health of the woman is at risk, constitutes a form of institutional violence and may constitute a form of torture, in violation of Article 4 of the Convention.” It has also reiterated “its deep concern about the restrictive abortion laws in place in the States Parties to the Convention and insists that restricting access to sexual and reproductive rights puts the human rights of women and girls at grave risk. For all these reasons, the Committee insists that States should decriminalize abortion in the aforementioned cases and implement care protocols to guarantee the life and health of women who decide to terminate their pregnancy, whether they are victims of sexual violence or for therapeutic reasons.” This recommendation, in addition to being based on the interpretation of the Belém do Pará Convention, and contrary to the warnings of some during the Beatriz case, reflects a regional consensus in the Americas.
53.Finally, the criminalizing conduct recognized by international medical standards as an essential sexual and reproductive health service contradicts the obligation to guarantee the rights to life and personal integrity in connection with the right to health, affecting Beatriz. Indeed, as the Court has stated, the medical act, understood as the diagnostic and treatment acts performed by a doctor in the comprehensive care of patients, is not only “an essentially lawful act but also a duty of a doctor to provide it.” Women have the right to receive adequate, specialized, and differentiated healthcare “during pregnancy, childbirth, and a reasonable period postpartum to guarantee the mother’s right to health and prevent maternal mortality and morbidity,”⁶⁹ which includes, not only in my view but also that of United Nations specialized bodies, the possibility of terminating a pregnancy when necessary to protect the woman’s life and integrity or when the fetus’s extrauterine life is unviable.
60.Finally, regarding the treatment the Inter-American Court has given to Beatriz’s case, I must express that decisions by the Courts on these issues cannot be made based on circumstantial considerations tied to more or less progressive political projects. The positions of governments and interest groups in the region should not determine the focus of the Court’s decisions. I hope that in future cases, the Tribunal will return to its guiding principle of protecting human rights, based exclusively on its competencies and obligations as the guarantor and highest interpreter of the American Convention on Human Rights.
Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto
Judge
Pablo Saavedra Alessandri
Secretary